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Abstract
Theoretical developments in the law are interesting things: They exist solely as ideals waiting to be actualized,
but because the law is one of those fields where academic discourse regularly has a meaningful impact on
courtrooms and legislatures, they are not completely academic in that word’s most pejorative sense. Model
legislation, for example, serves as both a theoretical outline of a specific legal doctrine and a possible model for
future legislative and jurisprudential developments; it is never merely a hypothetical model since it is always
ready to become living law. Theoretical developments in international criminal law operate similarly, though
they have something of a keener edge. Yes, they are made concrete in the legislature and the courtroom, but
grotesque harm must have been done for the law to enter the courtroom in the first place. And that is the real
horror behind legal developments in international criminal law and crimes against humanity: If they are ever
brought into actual courtrooms, they are borne on a red wake. It is precisely because that tide keeps rolling in
that books like Atrocity Speech Law are useful.
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Atrocity Speech Law,  
by Gregory S. Gordon1
SAM ZUCCHI2
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW are interesting things: They exist 
solely as ideals waiting to be actualized, but because the law is one of those fields 
where academic discourse regularly has a meaningful impact on courtrooms and 
legislatures, they are not completely academic in that word’s most pejorative sense. 
Model legislation, for example, serves as both a theoretical outline of a specific 
legal doctrine and a possible model for future legislative and jurisprudential 
developments; it is never merely a hypothetical model since it is always ready 
to become living law. Theoretical developments in international criminal law 
operate similarly, though they have something of a keener edge. Yes, they are 
made concrete in the legislature and the courtroom, but grotesque harm must 
have been done for the law to enter the courtroom in the first place. And that 
is the real horror behind legal developments in international criminal law and 
crimes against humanity: If they are ever brought into actual courtrooms, they 
are borne on a red wake. It is precisely because that tide keeps rolling in that 
books like Atrocity Speech Law are useful.
Atrocity Speech Law takes as its subject matter the past, present, and future 
of international hate speech—Gordon’s term for the “piecemeal”3 law that deals 
with public incitement to commit genocide and verbal persecution as a subset 
of crimes against humanity. Gordon’s main objective is to critique the current 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
2. BA (University of King’s College), JD (Osgoode Hall).
3. Gordon, supra note 1 at 3.
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legal structure: “international hate speech law” is marked by “its fragmented 
and haphazard treatment in both the jurisprudence and the scholarship.”4 But, 
in order to more accurately lay out its failings, Gordon explores the historical legal 
foundation to explain how we got here in the first place. Yet, this is not a history 
book—or, at least, not solely a history book. Both its historical narrative and its 
contemporary criticisms are geared towards outlining and justifying his proposals 
for a new, unified, and cohesive body of international law. To that end, Atrocity 
Speech Law has a tripartite focus, which is neatly summarized by the labels it uses 
for its three sections: “Foundation,” “Fragmentation,” and “Fruition.”
“Foundation” covers the legal and historical foundation of international hate 
speech. First, there is a brief historical summary of the way in which speech 
has been used to promote and provoke what we would now call crimes against 
humanity. Here, the starting point is not the Armenian Genocide of 1915–17 
or the Holocaust, but Pharaoh Amenemhet I, who “is recorded as having incited 
against other ethnic groups in his region, whom he would ultimately slaughter 
and enslave, by describing them as animals.”5 More relevant for readers, perhaps, 
is the discussion of recent history: The Holocaust, the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
and the Rwandan Genocide. This historical analysis then leads into an outline of 
contemporary international and domestic mechanisms for curtailing hate speech: 
international treaties, various international courts of human rights, the divergent 
treatment of hate speech domestically, and the foundational decisions of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Out of this narrative, Gordon focuses on the two different strains of 
international hate speech law. The first is persecution, which falls under the larger 
umbrella that is crimes against humanity. While persecution covers more actions 
than just speech, the prosecutions of Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche at the 
Nuremburg Tribunal are the foundational cases regarding hate speech as examples 
of persecution. The former was the founder and publisher of Der Stürmer, a Nazi 
paper that regularly printed anti-Semitic propaganda; the latter was a minister 
in the Nazi government and (more importantly for the sake of the prosecution) 
a radio personality who similarly distributed anti-Semitic propaganda over the 
airwaves. The former was convicted of crimes against humanity on the basis 
of political and racial persecution; the latter escaped conviction at Nuremburg 
“with self-serving statements and naked denials.”6 Fortunately, the West German 
government later convicted him.
4. Ibid at 5.
5. Ibid at 31.
6. Ibid at 111.
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The development of the second strain—incitement to genocide—did not 
emerge until the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.7 Specifically, Article III, which makes “[d]irect and public 
incitement to commit genocide”8 a punishable international offence. Left out 
of this convention, however, was the suggestion made by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics to include “[a]ll forms of public propaganda (Press, radio, 
cinema, etc.), aimed at inciting racial, national, or religious enmities or hatreds; 
or at provoking the commission of acts of genocide.”9 Similarly unsuccessful 
was the Soviet suggestion to ban preparatory actions, such as issuing orders 
or instructions with the goal of committing genocide, along with a pledge to 
“disband and prohibit organizations that incite racial hatred or the commission 
of genocidal acts.”10 The world would need to wait half a century to see this law 
developed, with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). Both of these 
tribunals adopted wholesale the language of the Genocide Convention (therefore 
incorporating Article III and the incitement offence) while also enumerating 
specific offences that would comprise crimes against humanity (persecution). 
The Rome Statute,11 which gave rise to the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”), borrowed the language of its own founding statute from that of the two 
International Tribunals.
The second part covers “Fragmentation,” or instances where the case law 
surrounding international hate speech law has proven lacking or contradictory. 
Here, Atrocity Speech Law shifts from narrative to explicit criticism of the various 
inconsistencies or gaps in the law. For example, the ICTR set out, in Prosecutor v 
Jean-Paul Akayesu,12 the four elements of public incitement to genocide:
(1) “direct” (whether the persons for whom the message was intended immediately 
grasped the implication thereof—from this one can deduce that the message can 
be implicit); (2) “public” (a call for criminal action to a number of individuals in a 
public place or to members of the general public via mass media); (3) incitement 
7. 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
8. Ibid, art III.
9. Genocide – Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council: Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics: Amendments to the draft convention (E/794), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, 
UN Doc A/C.6/215/Rev.1 (1948) at 3 cited in Gordon, supra note 1 at 122.
10. Gordon, supra note 1 at 122.
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2178 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 July 2002).
12. Trial Judgment (2 September 1998) at paras 555-60 (International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda), online: ICTR-96-4-T, <unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/
ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf>.
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(illegal urging to commit genocide parsed by reference to purpose and context); and 
(4) mens rea (the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group, as such).13
Important, however, is the fact that “[c]ausation … was not an element of the 
crime.”14 Gordon proceeds to note issues with all these elements, ranging from 
the pedantic to the substantial. Regarding the “direct” element—the first one—
he asks, “for a speech to be considered direct, is it limited to certain grammatical 
tenses? Does it have to be in the imperative—for instance, ‘Attack the traitors 
now?’”15 While his lament that “[n]ot creating a lexicon to classify such categories 
of speech as techniques of incitement was certainly a lost opportunity”16 may 
seem overly fastidious, it nevertheless reflects the level of scrutiny Gordon directs 
to previous jurisprudence. It also reflects the lack of rigour and consistency that 
previous courts have shown in the past—including the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).17 Similarly, the 
focus on causation as an element of the offence, as influenced by “Akayesu’s 
partially cloaking it in the mantle of [a] quasi-legal element, has led some experts 
to speculate whether it constitutes a de facto requirement.”18 This despite the fact 
that the original source is prima facie ambiguous in its requirement for causation. 
Gordon’s concern in “Fragmentation” is not that of a pedant’s ‘tsk-tsk,’ nor is this 
simply disapproval at an instance of an untidy law. His point is more troubling, 
as he notes that “the resulting confusion has helped give license to repressive 
regimes to suppress legitimate speech.”19
But beyond noting flaws and criticisms in the current incitement and 
persecution model of international hate speech, Gordon also points to a 
surprisingly substantial gap: “the problem in reference to war crimes is quite 
different. In effect, the issue is a relative absence of law.”20 There are no laws 
punishing civilians or military members inciting soldiers to commit genocide 
or other crimes against humanity. To illustrate why this is necessary, Gordon 
13. Gordon, supra note 1 at 185.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid at 188.
16. Ibid.
17. 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100. Gordon singles this Canadian case out specifically as 
a particularly egregious example of how courts fail to apply the extant legal framework 
for the prosecution of incitement. For a more extended criticism, see Gordon, supra 
note 1 at 201-04.
18. Gordon, supra note 1 at 199.
19. Ibid at 186.
20. Ibid at 253.
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cites a number of instances from the historical record. For example, General 
Jacob Smith’s command to make a “howling wilderness” of Samar during the 
Philippine-American War; and the allegations that General Geoffrey D. Miller 
told soldiers to treat the prisoners “like dogs” while overseeing Abu Ghraib.21 
These also include civilian orders to the military—consider examples like the 
Rwandan Genocide, where Rwandan radio and television stations played an 
important role in alerting soldiers to the location of hiding Tutsis. Gordon even 
lists Donald Trump’s comments on the campaign trail regarding torture and 
collective punishment as examples of incitement to commit war crimes:
if it were determined that Trump’s words encouraged or gave comfort to soldiers 
contemplating commission of the crimes he advocated in his public remarks … 
Trump could not be prosecuted. Such impunity would be the result of a complete 
absence of law criminalizing incitement to commit war crimes.22
The third and final part—titled “Fruition”—is Gordon’s real contribution to 
the field. The kinds of changes he makes are neatly encapsulated by the proposed 
renaming of a unified body of law: Atrocity speech law. It is a series of proposals 
designed to build on the groundwork outlined in “Foundation” and remedy the 
issues noted in “Fragmentation.” He makes proposals like removing the causation 
requirement absolutely from incitement: “the incitement crime is inchoate and 
geared toward prevention. That means early intervention. Having a causation 
requirement would be inimical to that goal.”23 Another suggestion entails the 
passage of an international treaty designed to codify atrocity speech law offences, 
and he even provides the text of said treaty. And, for good measure, Gordon 
provides a lexicon that contains all possible variations of “direct” incitement, 
including: direct calls for destruction, verminization, euphemisms and metaphors, 
victim-sympathizer conflation, and so on.24
In short, in “Fruition” Gordon manages to reckon with nearly every 
critique previously introduced. This comprehensiveness is necessary, as one of 
the recurrent criticisms of international hate speech law throughout the book is 
its incoherent and haphazard conception and implementation. At Nuremberg, 
for example, the International Military Tribunal’s charter lacks any specific 
language dealing with speech, despite the fact that “hate speech was the focal 
point of two different prosecutions.”25 Gordon’s proposal is centred around not 
21. Ibid at 254-56.
22. Ibid at 264.
23. Ibid at 283.
24. Ibid at 284-91.
25. Ibid at 369.
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merely patching discrete issues, but in reimagining the whole legal apparatus 
via a unified liability theory; the different core crimes would be unified under 
three distinct—but related—offences: genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes. Liability would then occur through incitement, a proposed offence 
of speech abetting, instigation, and ordering.26 However, it is here—where the 
book purports to add to the body of scholarship—where we get to Atrocity 
Speech Law’s major handicap. The proposed changes do not offer suggestions for 
overcoming the practical obstacles in the way of their implementation. By this, 
I do not mean that there is no step-by-step plan for the proposed atrocity speech 
law treaty—rather, I mean that some of the points raised earlier in the book 
are major obstacles to his proposals, and they are simply not addressed in the 
third section. The most obvious example would be the United States’ approach 
to freedom of speech: “Foundation” discusses the American jurisprudence on the 
First Amendment, with an eye to outlining the legal status of freedom of speech 
in countries that have not incorporated hate speech laws into their domestic 
legal system. Following Gordon’s discussion, it is clear that such regimes would 
stand almost opposed to the unified theory of liability he proposes. For example, 
one of the exceptions to the First Amendment’s broad guarantee of freedom of 
speech—so-called “fighting words”—nevertheless did not permit the prosecution 
of a burning cross placed on a black family’s lawn.27 But there is no thorough 
engagement with this issue.
Almost in that sense, Atrocity Speech Law feels like it was published too soon. 
This is not to say that it was insufficient or half-baked—the book is a thorough 
and informative explanation of both how we reached this point, and what we 
can do to move forward. But in the sense that it feels like events have overtaken 
it. In texture and tone, it feels like a product of the late ‘90s and early ‘00s in its 
approach to international criminal law, reliant as it is on the model of the liberal 
international consensus that birthed the United Nations, peacekeeping missions, 
and international tribunals designed to punish grotesque violations of human 
rights. But such a model relies upon the existence of a liberal international 
consensus in the first place; what is it to do when the keystone of that whole 
apparatus can no longer be relied upon? It is easy to infer that this book’s final 
draft was sent to printers before one of the United States’ most prominent white 
supremacists, Richard Spencer, was profiled in Mother Jones and the Washington 
Post—before he said, in response to a question about how the United States 
26. For a detailed explanation, see ibid at 376-91.
27. RAV v St Paul (City of ), 505 US 377 (1992). See also Gordon, supra note 1 at 86.
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would be made whites only, “maybe it will be horribly bloody and terrible.”28 
Before Charlottesville, and the mob that shouted “The Jew will not replace us!” 
Before 2017’s sudden and stark rise in the kind of talk that Gordon labels atrocity 
speech. And, because the book feels just half a step behind, the suggestions it 
offers feel less than concrete: Donald Trump is still only a presidential candidate 
in Atrocity Speech Law, and he is cited as “[t]he most prominent recent example 
of potential liability for incitement to war crimes.”29 From a purely academic 
perspective, this makes sense—but the notion of finding the President of the 
United States liable for incitement to commit war crimes is practicably absurd.
This blind spot extends to characters like Richard Spencer or Andrew Anglin, 
the publisher of The Daily Stormer (until recently, the world’s largest neo-Nazi 
website). It is incredibly unlikely that these figures would be subject to the 
proposed regime regarding persecution. Arguably, they meet the requirements: 
Under Gordon’s unified theory of liability, incitement to crimes against humanity 
would be captured by atrocity speech law, and both the International Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have deportation and extermination as 
specific offences under the crimes against humanity (persecution) umbrella. Yet, 
it is practically unlikely that Spencer and Anglin would ever face incitement 
charges, simply because their government has no real interest in pursuing those 
charges: As Gordon himself notes, the level of protection afforded by the American 
approach to even the most odious speech is incredibly high, and he offers no 
real suggestion for overcoming this barrier. Nor does he offer any suggestions 
for dealing with the notion that international law is viewed, by America, “as 
an imposition on and a usurpation of” American sovereignty.30 But it is not 
just that Gordon has failed to grapple with the problem of American immunity. 
Perceptions of unfair targeting of non-Western nations have led to countries 
28. John Woodrow Cox, “‘Let’s party like it’s 1933’: Inside the alt-right world of 
Richard Spencer,” The Washington Post (22 November 2016), online: <www.
washingtonpost.com/local/lets-party-like-its-1933-inside-the-disturbing-alt-right-
world-of-richard-spencer/2016/11/22/cf81dc74-aff7-11e6-840f-e3ebab6bcdd3_story.
html?utm_term=.bd1dad328095>.
29. Gordon, supra note 1 at 262.
30. Patrick Hagopian, American Immunity: War Crimes and the Limits of International Law 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013) at 10.
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repeatedly threatening to withdraw from the ICC.31 Expanding speech crimes in 
the manner proposed—and with the expected American exclusion—would likely 
further harm the ICC’s reputation for impartiality.
In fairness, these are issues that mere theory cannot resolve, and Gordon’s 
thesis is not going to mend the gap between ideal and implementation. Nor can 
it account for the disturbing changes we have seen over the recent past, even as 
these changes have made clearer the limitations of the institutions of the liberal 
international order. Yet, despite recent events, works like Gordon’s still have 
value: Theoretical proposals are often just waiting for the right moment to be 
implemented. At the very least, books like Atrocity Speech Law represent the belief 
that things will get better. That we will have a more rational, effective way of 
dealing with some of the gravest crimes known to mankind in—perhaps—a more 
rational and just world.
31. Norimitsu Onishi, “South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court,” 
The New York Times (8 March 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/
south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html>; Jina Moore, “Burundi Quits International Criminal 
Court,” The New York Times (27 October 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/
world/africa/burundi-international-criminal-court.html>. For a more legalistic analysis of 
the background of these events, see Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “The Rise of the African Union 
Opposition to the International Criminal Court’s Investigations and Prosecutions of African 
Leaders” (2013) 13:2 Intl Crim L Rev 385.
